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1 Introduction.
One of the most recurrent themes in monetary theory is that of Money
Neutrality. For several hundred years (dating back to David Hume [12] in
the 17th century) economists have argued whether changes in money supply
have any effect on real variables like production, consumption, employment
or real wages. A huge amount of empirical and theoretical research has been
produced and yet the issue is still debated.
The recent view regarding the neutrality of money is from the New Clas-
sical Macroeconomics School. The neutrality theory, developed by Lucas
[25], Sargent and Wallace [31] and often referred to as LSW proposition,
states that any anticipated monetary shock would have no effect on real
economic variables neither in the short run nor in the long run. Based on
their theory of Rational Expectations, New Classical economists believe in
the idea of policy irrelevance. In other words, since individuals hold Ra-
tional Expectations, they conclude that fully anticipated monetary policies
are ineffective in the short run, as well as in the long run; only unantici-
pated policy shocks can influence real variables in the short run while in the
long run the classical neutrality proposition holds. In a model in which the
stock of money is exogenous, under the LSW proposition, the growth rate
of money, assumed exogenous as well and fully perceived by agents, is the
sole determinant of the rate of inflation: money is said to be dynamically
neutral.
In Rational Beliefs Equilibria (RBE) money is generically non-neutral.
Given the expectational perspective proposed by the Theory of RBE, we
show that one of the most important factors in the emergence of money
non-neutrality is played by Endogenous Uncertainty1. This, in contrast to
the Rational Expectations results of money neutrality and policy ineffec-
tiveness, leads to a scenario in which monetary policy has an impact on
the real economy and price volatility. Under Rational Beliefs agents have
different beliefs and different predictions about the effect of any particular
monetary policy. Such heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution
and intensity of agents’ states of optimism/pessimism can amplify the real
effect of monetary policy and/or generate endogenous fluctuations in the
economy which are not explained by any exogenous shock. In the model un-
der study in this paper the exogenous monetary growth rate is not the sole
determinant of the inflation rate. States of belief amplify or decrease the ef-
fect of monetary policy on price level fluctuations leading to a more volatile
pattern of inflation rates than under the Macro Rational Expectations hy-
pothesis and thus making money dynamically non-neutral. We claim that
money non-neutrality is mostly an expectations driven phenomenon. Indeed,
additional assumptions of asymmetry of information and/or unanticipated
1 “Endogenous Uncertainty is that component of price volatility which is caused
by the distribution of beliefs” (Kurz and Motolese [23], p. 13). For an exhaustive
definition of Endogenous Uncertainty and a discussion of its emergence and role
in equilibrium see also Kurz [17], [20] and [21].
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monetary policy are not needed to explain the real effect of monetary policy
as it is customary in the New Classical Theory.
The Rational Expectations approach dominated almost all economic
thought in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. However, a growing stream of re-
search in the 1980’s has been devoted to the issue of policy effectiveness
and many examples have been constructed to demonstrate the theoretical
possibility of non-neutrality of money even when agents anticipate changes
in money supply (see Fisher [7],[8] and Phelps and Taylor [30]). Chiappori
and Guesnerie [5] proves the existence of a new class of non-linear solutions
to the Lucas’ [25] model which exhibit the non-neutrality property. Concern
about the validity of the LSW proposition has also been raised by the the-
oretical sunspots literature. Azariadis [1], Azariadis and Guesnerie [2], Cass
and Shell [4] and others show that money can be non-neutral in a wide class
of models in which equilibrium depends on the realization of such random
variables as sunspots which have no inherent relevance to the fundamentals
of the economy.
The main bulk of the New Classical Macroeconomics rests on the as-
sumption that all agents hold Rational Expectations. In order to explain
the empirical evidence of money non-neutrality the New Classical theorists
introduce asymmetric information which becomes the driving force of the
theory: agents are assumed to be unable to observe information which is
public in other parts of the economy. In this paper we show that money non-
neutrality can arise endogenously and one way to do this is to allow agents
to hold heterogeneous beliefs which are rationally formed in the sense of the
Theory of Rational Beliefs developed by Kurz [18], [19]2.
This paper also addresses the issue of finding numerical solution to a Ra-
tional Belief infinite horizon monetary economy. The exogenous stochastic
processes of money growth and dividends along with the endogenous state
of belief of agents completely determine the transition probability of the
economy from date t to date t+1. The stochastic structure of the economy
is Markov and we are interested in the numerical solutions of such an econ-
omy. In computing equilibria we follow closely the work of Judd, Kubler
and Schmedders [15] who developed a computational procedure based on
the B-spline collocation methods of approximating the equilibrium price
and portfolio policy functions. In order to study the dynamic behavior of
the economy, time series are generated via MonteCarlo simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model of a standard infinite horizon pure monetary exchange economy and
defines both the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and the RBE.
Section 3 describes the computational procedure used to numerically solve
for equilibria of the model in section 2. Section 4 reports and discusses
the simulated results of money neutrality/non-neutrality and the effects of
monetary policy both in REE and in RBE. Section 5 concludes.
2 The effect of heterogeneous beliefs on equilibrium variables has also been stud-
ied by Harrison and Kreps [10], Varian [33] and Harris and Raviv [9].
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2 The model.
We consider a standard infinite horizon pure monetary exchange economy
with a single, homogeneous, consumption good and two infinitely lived
agents. Each one of them receives at the beginning of each period an endow-
ment (reflecting labor output) of the commodity. Additional output, as in
Lucas [26] is exogenously introduced in the economy by a production firm
which is owned by the agents. The profit of the firm is produced according
to the stationary Markov process {Dt, t = 1, 2, ...}, that will be specified be-
low. The ownership of the shares, which we call stock, is a long-lived asset in
aggregate unit net supply. In the financial structure of the economy, beside
the stock market, a market for fiat money exists. Fiat money is issued by a
government and is transferred to the agents at the beginning of each period.
The transfer is assumed to be proportional to the pre-transfer holdings of
the agents. LetMt−1denote the aggregate pre-transfer money holdings, that
is the aggregate money purchased by the agents at t − 1 and carried over
next period at date t. Then the aggregate post-transfer money holdings at
date t are given by the equation
Mt =Mt−1xt (1)
where {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary Markov process that will be specified
below. Each agent’s initial endowment of the two assets is denoted by πk0 =(
θk0 ,M
k
0
)
, k = 1, 2.3 Note that our modeling of money follows the “Chicago”
tradition in economic literature of using helicopter money as opposed to the
most realistic open market operations money. The notation which we employ
is as follows: for k = 1, 2
Ckt - consumption of agent k at t
θkt - stock holdings of agent k at t
Mkt - money holdings of agent k at t
Pt - price of consumption good at date t
q˜t - price of common stock at t
Ωkt - endowment of agent k at t
Dt - total amount of dividends produced exogenously at t
Mt - money supply at date t
Ht - history of all observable up to t
uk (·, ·) - the utility function of agent k.
Each agent k has von-Neumann-Morgensten preferences which are de-
fined by a strictly monotone C2 concave utility function uk : R++×R++ →
R and a discount factor βk ∈ (0, 1). For any consumption sequence Ck =
3 It would be straightforward to extend the theoretical study of this model
to the case of several infinitely lived assets and several agents. However, since
we are interested in the numerical solutions of such model, we are constrained by
computational feasibility and we chose not to introduce further assets or agents. In
fact, this would increase the number of state-variables and cause various technical
problems for our computations.
Money non-neutrality in a RBE with financial assets. 5
{
Ckt
}∞
t=0
and real money balances sequence Mk =
{
Mkt /Pt
}∞
t=0
the associ-
ated utility for agent k is therefore:
Uk
(
Ck,Mk
)
= E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtku
k
(
Ckt ,
Mkt
Pt
)}
.
2.1 The Equilibrium Concept.
The optimization problem of agent k for k = 1, 2 has the following common
structure at all t = 1, 2, ...:
max
(Ck,θk,Mk)
EQkt
{ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−1k u
k
(
Ckτ ,
Mkτ
Pτ
)
| Ht
}
. (2)
subject to
PtC
k
t + q˜tθ
k
t +M
k
t = PtΩ
k
t + θ
k
t−1 (q˜t + PtDt) +M
k
t−1xt
Ckt ,M
k
t ≥ 0
πk0 =
(
θk0 ,M
k
0
)
given.
(3)
To enable us to compute the various equilibria in this chapter we as-
sume that the common utility function of the two agents has the following
functional form
1
1− γk
(
Ckt
)1−γk + 1
1− νk
(
Mkt
Pt
)1−νk
γk, νk > 0. (4)
With this specification the Euler equations of agent k for k = 1, 2 are
− q˜t
Pt
(
Ckt
)−γk + βkEQkt
((
Ckt+1
)−γk ( q˜t+1
Pt+1
+Dt+1
)
| Ht
)
= 0 (5)
− 1
Pt
(
Ckt
)−γk + 1
Pt
(
Mkt
Pt
)−νk
+ βkEQkt
((
Ckt+1
)−γk (xt+1
Pt+1
)
| Ht
)
= 0
(6)
and the market clearing conditions are
θ1t + θ
2
t = 1 (7)
M1t +M
2
t =Mt. (8)
We assume that the economy is Markovian where the exogenous process
of dividends {Dt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary and ergodic Markov process.
The state space of the process is ∆ =
{
DH ,DL
}
with transition matrix[
ϑ 1− ϑ
1− ϑ ϑ
]
. (9)
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We refer to DH
(
DL
)
as the high (low) dividend states.
The exogenous growth process of money {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} is also a sta-
tionary and ergodic Markov process. The state space of the process is
X =
{
xH , xL
}
with transition matrix[
χ 1− χ
1− χ χ
]
. (10)
We refer to xH
(
xL
)
as the loose (tight) monetary policy states. Through-
out the paper we assume that xt are observable at date t. This assumption
needs to be evaluated in relation to the assumption made by Lucas [25] and
we comment on this later.
To ensure stability in the sense of Kurz [18] let us define pt = Pt/Mt4,
qt = q˜t/Mt and let zkt = M
k
t /Mt be the proportion of the total money
supply held by agent k at t.
In equilibrium the inflation rates for all transitions from t to t + 1 are
defined by
it+1 =
Pt+1 − Pt
Pt
t = 1, 2, ... (11)
and using the definition, given above, of pt and equation (1) we redefine
them by
it+1 =
xt+1pt+1 − pt
pt
t = 1, 2, ... (12)
Given the definitions above we then rewrite the maximization problem
of agent k for k = 1, 2 at all t as follows:
max
(Ck,θk,zk)
EQkt
{ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−1k
(
1
1− γk
(
Ckτ
)1−γk + 1
1− νk
(
zkτ
pτ
)1−νk)
| Ht
}
.
(13)
subject to
ptC
k
t + qtθ
k
t + z
k
t = ptΩ
k
t + θ
k
t−1 (qt + ptDt) + z
k
t−1
Ckt , z
k
t ≥ 0
πk0 =
(
θk0 , z
k
0
)
given.
(14)
The Euler equations of agent k for k = 1, 2 are
− qt
pt
(
Ckt
)−γk + βkEQkt
((
Ckt+1
)−γk ( qt+1
pt+1
+Dt+1
)
| Ht
)
= 0 (15)
4 To simplify notation in the rest of the paper we call the ratios pt = Pt/Mt ,
“prices”.
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− 1
pt
(
Ckt
)−γk + 1
pt
(
zkt
pt
)−νk
+ βkEQkt
((
Ckt+1
)−γk ( 1
pt+1
)
| Ht
)
= 0
(16)
and the market clearing conditions are
θ1t + θ
2
t = 1 (17)
z1t + z
2
t = 1. (18)
Under our assumption on agents’ preferences the Euler equations of both
agents together with the market clearing conditions fully characterize a
competitive equilibrium.
Note that xt disappeared from the budget constraint of the agent. This
is a direct result of the assumption that xt is observed and hence givenMt−1
the knowledge of Mt and xt are equivalent. We find it easier to write the
system in terms of Mt rather than xt. However, expectations of Mt+1 must
be based on the conditional expectations of xt+1 sinceMt+1 =Mtxt+1. But
then the information about xt is indeed part of the system (15)-(18) since
xt is part of the conditioning Ht in equation (13).
We shall continue to assume that changes in the money supply are uni-
form across agents.
Definition 1 A Markov Competitive Equilibrium with initial portfolio hold-
ings
(
π10 , π
2
0
)
is a stochastic process of prices, portfolios and exogenous
shocks
{(
pt, qt, π
1
t , π
2
t ,Dt, xt
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
with the specified initial portfolio
at t = 0 such that
(i) these random variables satisfy, at all dates t, equations (14),(15)-(16)
and the market clearing conditions (17)-(18);
(ii) there exist two sequences of functions
(
ξ1t , ξ
2
t
)
such that the optimal
portfolios satisfy the Markovian condition πkt = ξ
k
t
(
Dt, xt, π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
k =
1, 2;
(iii) the price process {(pt, qt) , t = 1, 2, ...} is defined by a sequence of func-
tions
[
pt
qt
]
= Φt
(
Dt, xt, π
1
t−1, π
2
t−1
)
.
The time dependence of the functions in definition 1 represents the po-
tential time dependence of the beliefs of the agents. In the case of REE
there are no states of beliefs which affect prices and all functions are not
time dependent. More specifically, given the price map in (iii) we com-
pute recursive equilibria in our infinite horizon economy assuming that the
individuals’ portfolios holdings
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
are functions of
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
, the
exogenous shocks Dt and xt, and of the endogenous state of beliefs. We fol-
low the usual assumption in the applied literature (see for example Telmer
[32], Heaton and Lucas [11] or Judd, Kubler and Schmedders [14],[15]) of
asserting that the exogenous state and the agents’ portfolio holdings consti-
tute a sufficient statistic for the evolution of the infinite horizon economy.
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In any RBE such minimal state space is enlarged to include the endoge-
nous state of beliefs. We also postulate the existence of continuous policy
functions f and price functions g which map last period’s portfolio hold-
ings, the current endogenous state of beliefs and the exogenous shocks into
the current portfolio holdings and asset prices, respectively. No conditions
on the fundamentals of the economy are known to ensure existence of a
recursive equilibrium (see Judd, Kubler and Schmedders [14],[15] for a de-
tailed discussion) and, as it standard in the applied literature, we assume
the existence of such an equilibrium. We further comment on this set of
assumptions later.
We now review the REE case before turning to the more general exam-
ination of RBE.
2.1.1 Rational Expectations Equilibria. In any REE Q1 = Q2 and there is
no state of beliefs to effect prices. Since we seek a Markov equilibrium, the
conditional probabilities of (pt+1, qt+1,Dt+1, xt+1) in (15)-(16) are condi-
tioned only on the realized value of Dt and xt, and on the portfolios at date
t, namely
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
. It then follows that the demand functions must take the
form
zkt = z
k
(
Dt, xt, π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
(19)
θkt = θ
k
(
Dt, xt, π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
. (20)
(19)-(20) and the market clearing conditions (17)-(18) imply the equi-
librium map [
pt
qt
]
= Φ̂
(
Dt, xt, π
1
t−1, π
2
t−1
)
. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the transition function of the equilibrium
Markov process can be described in the following way. Given the date t− 1
portfolios
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
, there are only four vectors of prices (pt, qt) that may
occur at date t:
( pHHt , q
HH
t ) associated with ( D
H
t , x
H
t )
( pHLt , q
HL
t ) associated with ( D
H
t , x
L
t )
( pLHt , q
LH
t ) associated with ( D
L
t , x
H
t )
( pLLt , q
LL
t ) associated with ( D
L
t , x
L
t ) .
Hence, there are only four distinct prices which may conditionally occur
at any date and the transition probabilities from prices at t to prices at
t+1 are exactly equal to the joint transitions from (Dt, xt) to (Dt+1, xt+1).
That is, given any portfolio
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
at date t, the time invariant transition
matrix of prices is(
pHHt+1 , q
HH
t+1
) (
pHLt+1, q
HL
t+1
) (
pLHt+1, q
LH
t+1
) (
pLLt+1, q
LL
t+1
)
( pHHt , q
HH
t ) ϑχ ϑ (1− χ) (1− ϑ)χ (1− ϑ) (1− χ)
( pHLt , q
HL
t ) ϑ (1− χ) ϑχ (1− ϑ) (1− χ) (1− ϑ)χ
( pLHt , q
LH
t ) (1− ϑ)χ (1− ϑ) (1− χ) ϑχ ϑ (1− χ)
( pLLt , q
LL
t ) (1− ϑ) (1− χ) (1− ϑ)χ ϑ (1− χ) ϑχ
.
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Indeed, as we show later, given that pt = Pt/Mt , xt are observed and
money is neutral under Rational Expectations it follows that at each date t,(
pHHt , q
HH
t
)
=
(
pHLt , q
HL
t
)
and
(
pLHt , q
LH
t
)
=
(
pLLt , q
LL
t
)
. Only two prices
are realized at any date t, the monetary shock has no impact and the tran-
sitions from prices at t to prices at t + 1 are entirely governed by the real
shock process in the economy. The transition probabilities are then exactly
equal to the joint transitions from Dt to Dt+1. That is, given any portfolio(
π1t , π
2
t
)
at date t, the time invariant transition matrix of prices is(
pHt+1, q
H
t+1
) (
pLt+1, q
L
t+1
)
( pHt , q
H
t ) ϑ 1− ϑ
( pLt , q
L
t ) 1− ϑ ϑ
.
In comparison with Lucas’ [25] finite horizon model, if xt are observed,
full neutrality is attained under Rational Expectations. Thus, our method-
ology is to assume that xt are observed and confirm that full neutrality is
realized even under infinite horizon. However, under the same assumption
we shall show later that neutrality is not preserved under Rational Beliefs
even when xt are observed. One of the reasons for the non-neutrality result
in RBE’s, as we shall see in details later, is that the endogenous unobserved
states of belief are part of the true state space of the economy which causes
the market structure to be dynamically incomplete. In the symmetric REE
under study, in which agents are identical, the absence of asymmetric infor-
mation and the money neutrality result cause the market structure to be
dynamically complete.
We now turn to the examination of the structure of beliefs.
2.1.2 The structure of beliefs. The development here uses concepts from
the Theory of Rational Beliefs for which a clear explanation can be found
in Kurz [20],[18], and [19].
We use the tools of assessment variables to construct Markov RBE as
developed in Kurz and Schneider [24]. Assessment variables are parame-
ters indicating how the agent perceives the state of the economy and are
thus tools for the description of stable and non-stationary processes. From
a purely formal point of view, the assessment variables of the two agents
are simply two infinite sequences of random variables which we denote by{
ykt , t = 1, 2, ...
}
for k = 1, 2. The variables may be correlated. In our appli-
cation, ykt ∈ Y = {1, 0}. Assessment variables attain their significance when
we formulate the way agents’ beliefs vary in response to different realiza-
tion of these variables. In general one may think of the belief of agent k as a
probability on the joint process
{(
pt, qt,Dt, xt, y
k
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
. However,
all dynamic decisions of agent k are made with the conditional probability
of {(pt, qt,Dt, xt) , t = 1, 2, ...} given the value taken by ykt . In the equilibria
formulated below
{(
pt, qt,Dt, xt, y
k
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
is a Markov process and
10 Maurizio Motolese
hence ykt are allowed to be interdependent with other variables. The condi-
tional probabilities of (pt+1, qt+1,Dt+1, xt+1) given (pt, qt,Dt, xt) will also
be a Markov process but it will be non-stationary; it will utilize different
matrices depending upon ykt .
Since ykt exhausts all the non-stationarity perceived by the agents, we
consider policy functions of the time invariant form
θkt = θ
k
(
Dt, xt, y
k
t , π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
(22)
zkt = z
k
(
Dt, xt, y
k
t , π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
. (23)
Note that in equations (15)-(16) agent k specifies the probability of(
pt+1, qt+1,Dt+1, xt+1, y
k
t+1
)
conditional on
(
pt, qt,Dt, xt, y
k
t , π
k
t−1
)
- the
value taken by his assessment variable jointly with the observed data. Given
that θkt+1 and z
k
t+1 are as in (22)-(23) it follows from our Markov assump-
tions that the demands of agent k for stocks and money are functions of
exactly the form specified in (22)-(23), which we then take to be the optimal
policies. Consequently we can write the market clearing conditions as
θ1
(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , π
1
t−1, pt, qt
)
+ θ2
(
Dt, xt, y
2
t , π
2
t−1, pt, qt
)
= 1 (24)
z1
(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , π
1
t−1, pt, qt
)
+ z2
(
Dt, xt, y
2
t , π
2
t−1, pt, qt
)
= 1. (25)
Agent k’s demand functions for stocks and money (22)-(23) do not depend
on the other agent’s assessment variable. Assessment variables are privately
perceived parameters indicating how an agent interprets current informa-
tion. These variables have purely subjective meaning and do not represent
objective and transferable “information”.
The system (24)-(25) implies that the equilibrium map of this economy
takes the form [
pt
qt
]
= Φ∗
(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t , π
1
t−1, π
2
t−1
)
. (26)
The equilibrium map (26) reveals that conditioning on the portfolios at
t−1, equilibrium prices are determined by the exogenous shocks Dt and xt,
and by the state of belief represented by the vector of assessment variables(
y1t , y
2
t
)
. We assumed that ykt ∈ Y = {1, 0}, and will later define the beliefs
so that “1” will be a state of optimism with respect to high dividend states
at date t+ 1 while “0” will be a state of pessimism. In the way we specify
the assessment variables, they completely specify the conditional probability
beliefs of the agents at any date.
The equilibrium map (26) implies that given each pair of portfolios(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
, there are at most 16 distinct price vectors (pt, qt) that may oc-
cur at date t and these correspond to the 16 combinations of
(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
.
Moreover, due to our Markov assumption and given any portfolios
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
,
the true, equilibrium, transition probability from the 16 prices (pt, qt) to
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the 16 prices (pt+1, qt+1) (which are likely to be different from prices at t)
is determined entirely by the transition probability from
(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
to(
Dt+1, xt+1, y
1
t+1, y
2
t+1
)
.
We select the stochastic joint process
{(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
to be
a stationary Markov process with a transition matrix Γ which is indepen-
dent of
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
. It follows from the equilibrium map (26) that, although
the values of prices at date t + 1 depend upon the portfolios
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
, the
true probability of transition from (pt, qt) to (pt+1, qt+1) is Γ at all t, inde-
pendent of
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
. This choice5 implies that the true equilibrium process
of prices {(pt, qt) , t = 1, 2, ...}, is a stationary process with a fixed transi-
tion probability from (pt, qt) to (pt+1, qt+1) defined by Γ . Since this is a
stationary transition it follows from the ergodic theorem that the agents,
who compute the empirical distribution of the equilibrium process, will dis-
cover Γ and this matrix will be used to construct the stationary measure.
We then say that the matrix Γ characterizes the stationary measure of the
equilibrium dynamics.
The optimum conditions (15)-(16) require each agent to forecast prices
(pt+1, qt+1) and his own portfolio next period. Since the forecasting of his
own portfolio is done conditional upon market prices at t, this task is within
the range of behavior that we can expect a rational agent to perform. A
more complex issue is the determination, at time t, of the set of 16 prices
{(pt+1, qt+1)}, that can be realized at date t+1, given the date t portfolios(
π1t , π
2
t
)
and prices (pt, qt). We assume that all agents know this set of prices
based on the past history of the equilibrium process.6
We can now clarify the role of assessment variables. In (22)-(23) we
specified that the demand functions are not time dependent and hence the
5 The equilibrium dynamics are generated by a fixed and stationary ma-
trix. This choice has been a matter of convenience and simplicity. The process{(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
could have been selected to be any stable process
with Markov stationary measure induced by the empirical distribution. In such a
case the fixed transition matrix Γ would characterize only the stationary measure
of the equilibrium dynamics rather than be the matrix of the true probability of
the equilibrium dynamics of prices.
6 The theory of rational beliefs is based on the premise of abundant set of past
data to reveal anything which can be statistically revealed. The problem here is
that the model has infinite number of prices and the relative frequency of any
particular price is zero for most prices. It is then true that the agents could look
at all past dates at which the given configuration of portfolios
(
θ1t , z
1
t , θ
2
t , z
2
t
)
and
prices (pt, qt) occurred in the past to determine the set of 16 prices that will occur
at t+1. The problem is that the frequency at which any particular configuration
of prices and portfolio occurs is zero. Agents could then disagree about the set
of prices that may occur at t+ 1. The assumption that the set of possible prices
is known to the agents is important for the simplification of the computations in
the following section. We may also note that even when agents know the set of
possible prices, they may still disagree upon the probabilities at which these prices
will occur and that depends upon the value which their assessment variable takes
at date t.
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assessment variables completely determine the conditional probabilities of
the agents. But from the assumption of a Markov equilibrium it must be
that an assessment variable ykt must determine completely the transition
matrix from (pt, qt) to (pt+1, qt+1) which is perceived by agent k at date t.
Moreover, ykt ∈ Y = {1, 0} implies that the agent has at most two 16× 16
Markov matrices and at each date the value taken by his assessment variable
determines which of these two the agent uses.
The equilibrium map (26) implies that
(
R
2 × R2 ×∆×X × Y × Y )∞
is the state space for prices. However, one can also think of the state space as(
R
2 × R2 × S)∞ where S is simply the price index space S = {1, 2, ..., 16}.
We then define a new equilibrium map Φ between the indexes of prices and
the states of dividends, monetary policy and assessment variables by
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

= Φ

x = xH D = DH y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xH D = DH y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xH D = DH y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xH D = DH y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xL D = DH y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xL D = DH y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xL D = DH y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xL D = DH y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xH D = DL y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xH D = DL y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xH D = DL y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xH D = DL y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xL D = DL y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xL D = DL y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xL D = DL y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xL D = DL y1 = 0 y2 = 0

. (27)
The maps (26) and (27) highlight the definition of Endogenous Un-
certainty which identifies the variability of prices at a given state of the
exogenous variables.
We finally turn to a technical issue that needs clarification. The reader
may have noted earlier that we defined agent k’s belief Qk as a probability
on the space of infinite sequences
{(
Dt, xt, y
k
t , π
1
t , π
2
t , pt, qt
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
.
However, we have shown that conditioning on the given portfolios
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
at t, the belief of an agent was reduced to selecting a transition matrix from
(pt, qt) to (pt+1, qt+1). Thus, we assumed that agents know the partition of
the price state space
(
R
2 × R2 ×∆×X × Y × Y )∞ induced by the distri-
bution of the exogenous variables. Note that this assumption implies that
the earlier specified states of optimism(pessimism) with respect to high(low)
dividend states at date t + 1 represent also states of optimism(pessimism)
about the occurrence of the associated stock prices. Since the high(low)
dividend states are those of the higher(lower) stock prices agents are thus
optimistic(pessimistic) with respect to high(low) stock prices at date t+ 1.
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The beliefs Q1 and Q2 of the two agents, given portfolios
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
at
date t, are represented by Markov transition matrices from
(
pt, qt, y
k
t
)
to(
pt+1, qt+1, y
k
t+1
)
. The probability used in (15)-(16) is Qk
(
(·) | yk), the
probability which is conditional on the assessment variable. The rationality
of belief conditions requires that
(i) Qk
(
(·) | yk) is a stable measure and the dynamics of the economy under
it has an empirical distribution with probability 1;
(ii) the stationary measure of Qk
(
(·) | yk) equals the probability on infinite
sequences induced by the true transition matrix Γ .
Since Qk
(
(·) | yk) is represented by the two Markov matrices used by
the agent at different times, we need to specify the joint distribution of(
pt, qt, y
k
t
)
and the implied rationality conditions which are consistent with
these Markov matrices. To do that we use the Conditional Stability Theorem
(see Kurz and Schneider [24] p. 494). It says that if the probability Qk of
the joint process
{(
pt, qt, y
k
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
is stable, then Qk
(
(·) | yk) is a
stable probability on {(pt, qt) , t = 1, 2, ...} and the stationary measure of
Qk
(
(·) | yk) is the marginal of Qk on (pt, qt) obtained by integrating on yk.
For simplicity in analysis and computations, we assume the marginal
distribution ofQk on ykt to be i.i.d. and denote this unconditional probability
by Qk
({
ykt = 1
})
= αk for k = 1, 2. The Conditional Stability Theorem
then implies that the beliefs of the two agents are described by two pairs of
matrices,
(
F 1, F 2
)
for agent 1 and
(
G1, G2
)
for agent 2, such that Q1 and
Q2 are characterized by the following conditions:
Q1 for agent 1: adopt F 1 if y1t = 1
adopt F 2 if y1t = 0
α1F
1 + (1− α1)F 2 = Γ
(28)
Q2 for agent 1: adopt G1 if y2t = 1
adopt G2 if y2t = 0
α2G
1 + (1− α2)G2 = Γ
(29)
where α1 is the frequency at which agent 1 uses matrix F 1 and α2 is the
frequency at which agent 2 uses matrix G1.
We proceed to construct the RBE by assembling the conditions which
the Markov transition matrix Γ has been assumed to satisfy. The matrix Γ
must satisfy the following
the marginal on ykt is i.i.d. with P
{
y1t = 1
}
= αk; (30)
the marginal on Dt is Markov as specified by (9 ) (31)
the marginal on xt is Markov as specified by (10 ) (32)
the joint distribution of
(
y1t , y
2
t
)
may depend upon Dt and xt. (33)
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The following matrix satisfies all the conditions specified in (30)-(33):
Γ =

ϑχA ϑ(1−χ)A (1−ϑ)χA (1−ϑ)(1−χ)A
ϑ(1−χ)B ϑχB (1−ϑ)(1−χ)B (1−ϑ)χB
(1−ϑ)χC (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C ϑχC ϑ(1−χ)C
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D (1−ϑ)χD ϑ(1−χ)D ϑχD
 (34)
where (A,B,C,D) are all 4×4 matrices characterized by the 18 parameters
(α1, α2, a, b, c, d), a = (a1, a2, a3, a4), b = (b1, b2, b3, b4), c = (c1, c2, c3, c4),
d = (d1, d2, d3, d4) and of the following type:
A =

a1 α1 − a1 α2 − a1 1 + a1 − α1 − α2
a2 α1 − a2 α2 − a2 1 + a2 − α1 − α2
a3 α1 − a3 α2 − a3 1 + a3 − α1 − α2
a4 α1 − a4 α2 − a4 1 + a4 − α1 − α2
 . (35)
(35) implies that P
{
y1t = 1
}
= αk for k = 1, 2 as required by (30).
Note, however, that although each process
{
ykt , t = 1, 2, ...
}
for k = 1, 2 is
very simple, the joint process
{(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
may be com-
plex: it allows correlation among the four variables and these effects could
be important. This joint effect of the assessment variables, as distinct from
the individually perceived effect, is part of Γ which describes the exter-
nalities of beliefs in the market performance. These externalities are re-
produced in the equilibrium process. They are aimed to specify those in-
teractions among agents which reflect the structure of communications in
society. To complete the definition of Q1 and Q2 in (28-29) it is left to
specify matrices
(
F 1, F 2, G1, G2
)
. Select 32 parameters λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λ16)
and µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µ16) which will be interpreted later, and define the row
vectors of A with the notation
Aj = (aj , α1 − aj , α2 − aj , 1 + aj − (α1 + α2)) j = 1, 2, 3, 4. (36)
Similar notation is used for B, C and D. We then construct the family of
rational beliefs which we use in the simulations by defining eight matrix
functions of z = (z1, z2, ..., z16):
A1 (z) =

z1A
1
z2A
2
z3A
3
z4A
4
 , Aϑ2 (z) =

1− ϑz1
1− ϑ A
1
1− ϑz2
1− ϑ A
2
1− ϑz3
1− ϑ A
3
1− ϑz4
1− ϑ A
4

(37)
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B1 (z) =

z5B
1
z6B
2
z7B
3
z8B
4
 , Bϑ2 (z) =

1− ϑz5
1− ϑ B
1
1− ϑz6
1− ϑ B
2
1− ϑz7
1− ϑ B
3
1− ϑz8
1− ϑ B
4

(38)
C1 (z) =

z9C
1
z10C
2
z11C
3
z12C
4
 , Cϑ2 (z) =

1− (1− ϑ) z9
ϑ
C1
1− (1− ϑ) z10
ϑ
C2
1− (1− ϑ) z11
ϑ
C3
1− (1− ϑ) z12
ϑ
C4

(39)
D1 (z) =

z13D
1
z14D
2
z15D
3
z16D
4
 , Dϑ2 (z) =

1− (1− ϑ) z13
ϑ
D1
1− (1− ϑ) z14
ϑ
D2
1− (1− ϑ) z15
ϑ
D3
1− (1− ϑ) z16
ϑ
D4

. (40)
Hence given the definitions (37)-(40) we define matrices
(
F 1 (λ) , F 2 (λ)
)
for
λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λ16) by
F 1 (λ)=

ϑχA1(λ) ϑ(1−χ)A1(λ) (1−ϑ)χAϑ2 (λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Aϑ2 (λ)
ϑ(1−χ)B1(λ) ϑχB1(λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Bϑ2 (λ) (1−ϑ)χBϑ2 (λ)
(1−ϑ)χC1(λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C1(λ) ϑχCϑ2 (λ) ϑ(1−χ)Cϑ2 (λ)
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D1(λ) (1−ϑ)χD1(λ) ϑ(1−χ)Dϑ2 (λ) ϑχDϑ2 (λ)

(41)
and F 2 (λ) is then defined by the rationality condition of beliefs
F 2 (λ) =
1
1− α1
(
Γ − α1F 1 (λ)
)
. (42)
Finally given the definitions (37)-(40) we define matrices
(
G1 (µ) , G2 (µ)
)
for µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µ16) by
G1 (µ)=

ϑχA1(µ) ϑ(1−χ)A1(µ) (1−ϑ)χAϑ2 (µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Aϑ2 (µ)
ϑ(1−χ)B1(µ) ϑχB1(µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Bϑ2 (µ) (1−ϑ)χBϑ2 (µ)
(1−ϑ)χC1(µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C1(µ) ϑχCϑ2 (µ) ϑ(1−χ)Cϑ2 (µ)
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D1(µ) (1−ϑ)χD1(µ) ϑ(1−χ)Dϑ2 (µ) ϑχDϑ2 (µ)

(43)
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and G2 (µ) is then defined by the rationality condition of beliefs
G2 (µ) =
1
1− α2
(
Γ − α2G1 (µ)
)
. (44)
In order to ensure non-negative entries in the matrices A,B,C and D
in (35), the selection of the vectors (λ, µ) is restricted by 96 inequality
constraints which define the feasible region. These constraints are as follows:
λs ≤ 1
ϑ
µs ≤ 1
ϑ
for s = 1, 2, ..., 8
λs ≤ 11− ϑ µs ≤
1
1− ϑ for s = 9, 10, ..., 16
λs ≤ 1
α1
µs ≤ 1
α2
for s = 1, 2, ..., 16
λs ≥ α1 + ϑ− 1
ϑα1
µs ≥ α2 + ϑ− 1
ϑα2
for s = 1, 2, ..., 8
λs ≥ α1 − ϑ(1− ϑ)α1 µs ≥
α2 − ϑ
(1− ϑ)α2 for s = 9, 10, ..., 16.
(45)
To motivate the construction of the family of rational beliefs above note
that the parameters λs and µs are multiplied by the rows of A,B,C and
D. They proportionally change the conditional probabilities of the four sets
of four states (1, 2, 3, 4), (5, 6, 7, 8), (9, 10, 11, 12) and (13, 14, 15, 16) rela-
tive to the stationary measure represented by the matrix Γ in (34). Since
λs and µs are the factors of proportionality by which agents’ conditional
probability beliefs deviate from the stationary probabilities in Γ , we refer
to them as intensity parameters. So far agents’ assessment variables have
been used to endogenously enlarge the price state space and no actual eco-
nomic meaning has been attached to them. They attain meaning only when
the agents specify how they interpret these variables in generating their
conditional probability beliefs. For example, λs > 1 implies increased prob-
abilities of states (1, 2, 3, 4) and (5, 6, 7, 8) in F 1 relative to Γ given that
agent 1 is in state s. This means that the assessment variables induce more
optimism or pessimism about the occurrence of states at t + 1 relative to
Γ . Given the equilibrium map (27), the family of Markovian Rational Be-
liefs constructed above allows any revision of the conditional probabilities
of states of high dividend exogenous shock (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) relative to
the stationary measure Γ , to be offset by an opposite direction revision
of the conditional probabilities of states of low dividend exogenous shock
(9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16).
2.1.3 Rational Belief Equilibria.
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Definition 2 A Markov RBE is a Markov Competitive Equilibrium such
that:
(i) associated with each date t optimal portfolio
{(
π1t , π
2
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
there
exist feasible sets of date t + 1 prices J
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
which are known to the
agents, each consisting of, at most, 16 prices;
(ii) each agent holds a Markov rational belief of the following form: at each
date t he uses one of two 16 × 16 price transition matrices (F 1, F 2) for
agent 1 and
(
G1, G2
)
for agent 2 in accord with his assessment variable and
the rationality conditions (28)-(29). All four matrices are Markov transition
matrices from J
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
to J
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
;
(iii) optimal portfolios take the form πkt = ξ
k
(
Dt, xt, y
k
t , π
k
t−1, pt, qt
)
k =
1, 2 and the equilibrium map has the form (26).
To clarify definition 2 we need to note what the agent is assumed to
know. He clearly does not know the equilibrium map (26). Indeed, he does
not observe the assessment variable of other agents and thus could not learn
the equilibrium map. In the optimization (2)-(3) we assume that at date t−1
the portfolio
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
is observed by all agents hence all know the set
of possible prices J
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
that may occur at date t. At date t the
agents use transition matrices from the 16 prices (pt, qt) in J
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
which are possible at t to the 16 prices (pt+1, qt+1) in J
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
which are
possible at t + 1. As we just noted, they know J
(
π1t−1, π
2
t−1
)
from date
t−1 information and they know J (π1t , π2t ) from the fact that date t market
prices (pt, qt) and portfolio
(
π1t , π
2
t
)
are also observed at date t.
3 Equilibrium price and portfolio policy functions.
In computing equilibria of the infinite horizon monetary economy under
study we follow closely the work of Judd, Kubler and Schmedders [14],[15]
who developed a computational procedure, specified below, based on the
B-spline collocation methods of approximating the equilibrium price and
portfolio policy functions. Such a numerical algorithm allows agents to have
a continuum of portfolios instead of allowing a discrete number of portfolios
as it is in the approach used by Heaton and Lucas [11]. Heaton and Lucas [11]
considered models with two agents and two securities and used a discretized
version of the state space which tends to result in large approximation error.
Indeed, they report error of up to 0.84 percent.
3.1 The possible space and short sales cost function.
As our model has two assets and two agents, the feasible space for the
portfolio state variables is a subset of R4. However if in equilibrium the
portfolio of agent 1 is π1t =
(
θ1t , z
1
t
)
, the portfolio of agent 2 must be
π2t =
(
1− θ1t , 1− z1t
)
. Hence, focusing only on agent 1 we select a set
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Ξ ⊂ R2 to be the set of possible equilibrium portfolios π1t =
(
θ1t , z
1
t
)
.
To well approximate the equilibrium price and policy functions by splines
with a finite number of nodes it is important to ensure that the endoge-
nous set Ξ is bounded. Agents are not allowed to take short positions in
money holdings since, given the specifications of the model, it would result
in allowing borrowing at zero cost (i.e. zero interest rate). On the other
hand they can take short positions in stock holdings. Allowing agents to
hold short positions causes some difficulties in the computational procedure
when, out of equilibrium, in order to ensure positive consumption, agents
may follow paths of unbounded sequences of short positions rendering the
feasible set not compact. This motivated the use of holding cost of short
positions. As for any unbounded sequence of short positions of agent 1 there
is a correspondent unbounded sequence of long positions of agent 2 and vice
versa, we also penalize any long position which exceeds the total supply of
stock in the market. The feasible set is then bounded in both directions.
The following cost function is then subtracted from the utility function of
agent k at date t:
κ
(
θkt
)
=

h/4
(
θkt
)4 if θkt < 0
h/4
(
θkt − 1
)4 if θkt > 1
0 otherwise
(46)
where h ∈ R+. With the set Ξ being compact, the parameter h may be
selected so that the quartic holding cost function κ
(
θkt
)
is very small inside
the set but rises rapidly if an agent optimal choice is to move out of the set
Ξ. Let κkθ = ∂κ
(
θkt
)
/∂θkt . With this change in the utility function of agent
k we modify the Euler equations (15)-(16) to account for (46). Finally, we
denote the set of possible equilibrium price vectors (pt, qt) by the bounded
set Υ .
Recall that we denote by ∆×X × Y × Y the state space of dividends,
monetary shock and state of beliefs and by S the set of indices of the 16
members of ∆ × X × Y × Y . We have assumed that the current state of
the dividends, the monetary shock and the assessment variables together
with last period’s portfolio provide sufficient information for an equilibrium.
We have postulated the existence of the following continuous equilibrium
functions
fk =
(
fkθ, fkz
)
: S ×Ξ ⇒ Ξ k = 1, 2
g = (p, q) : S ×Ξ ⇒ Υ
such that for all st ∈ S and π1t−1 ∈ Ξ, if the market clearing conditions are
substituted into the Euler equations then these equations are satisfied with
πkt = f
k
(
st, π
k
t−1, y
k
t
)
(47)
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and
(pt, qt) = g
(
st, π
1
t−1
)
. (48)
The functions fk determine the optimal portfolio of agent k given the
prices at date t (hence the state st), the assessment variable of agent k
at date t and the portfolio at date t − 1. The function g determines the
equilibrium prices at date t given the state st and the portfolio at date
t− 1.
We approximate the six functions f and g by two-dimensional tensor
products of B-splines of order 4 (see Appendix A.2 for details) and in what
follows we thus use fˆ and gˆ to denote such approximate policy functions.
3.2 The new system of Euler Equations.
Reconsider the budget equation (14), the Euler equations (15)-(16) and the
functions (47)-(48). Given the price index state s ∈ S = {1, 2, ..., 16} and
agent 1’s beginning-of-period portfolio holdings π1− =
(
θ1−, z
1
−
)
we define
agent 1’s current period consumption by
C1 = − gˆ
q
(
s, π1−
)
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) fˆθ (s, π1−)− fˆz (s, π1−)gˆp (s, π1−)
+Ω1 (s) + θ1−
(
gˆq
(
s, π1−
)
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) +D (s))+ z1−
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) . (49)
Let π1 =
(
fˆθ
(
s, π1−
)
, fˆz
(
s, π1−
))
denote agent 1’s current portfolio and
define his random next period consumption by
C˜1+ = −
gˆq
(
s˜, π1
)
gˆp (s˜, π1)
fˆθ
(
s˜, π1
)− fˆz (s˜, π1)
gˆp (s˜, π1)
+Ω1 (s˜) + fˆθ
(
s, π1−
)( gˆq (s˜, π1)
gˆp (s˜, π1)
+D (s˜)
)
+
fˆz
(
s, π1−
)
gˆp (s˜, π1)
. (50)
Agent 2’s current period consumption is defined by
C2 = Ω1 (s) +Ω2 (s) +D (s)− C1 (51)
and his random next period consumption is defined by
C˜2+ = Ω
1 (s˜) +Ω2 (s˜) +D (s˜)− C˜1+. (52)
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We thus obtain the following system of Euler equations for k = 1, 2
gˆq
(
s, π1−
)
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) (Ck)−γk + κkθ
= +βk
16∑
s˜=1
((
C˜k+
)−γk ( gˆq (s˜, π1)
gˆp (s˜, π1)
+D (s˜)
))
Qk
(
s˜ | s, yk) (53)
1
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) (Ck)−γk − 1
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) ( fˆkz (s, π1−)
gˆp
(
s, π1−
) )−νk
= +βk
16∑
s˜=1
((
C˜k+
)−γk ( 1
gˆp (s˜, π1)
))
Qk
(
s˜ | s, yk) . (54)
To compute the coefficients of the approximate policy functions fˆ and
gˆ we select a grid G of mesh points π1−(ij) =
(
θ1−(i), z
1
−(j)
)
i,j=1,··· ,n
. Now
we take these points to be equal to π1− and thus obtain 4 equations for
each mesh point and each price index state s ∈ S = {1, 2, ..., 16}. The
resulting system is very large and has n × n × 16 × 4 equations and un-
knowns7. To solve the system we follow the Gauss-Jacobi approach used by
Judd, Kubler and Schmedders [14],[15] in their spline collocation algorithm.
We thus compute the approximate policy functions fˆ and gˆ through an
iterative process starting with some initial guess fˆ0 and gˆ0. In each itera-
tion v = 1, 2, · · · , we then solve the system of Euler equations (53)-(54)8
at each mesh point π1− =
(
θ1−, z
1
−
) ∈ G and s ∈ S by computing cur-
rent portfolio decisions and asset prices given previous iteration functions
fˆv−1 and gˆv−1 determining the policy process in the subsequent period.
The coefficients characterizing the new set of functions fˆv and gˆv are fi-
nally obtained through interpolation. The procedure is discontinued when
the maximal change in the value of the approximate policy functions, at
all mesh points in successive iterations, is less then an error tolerance ε: if
maxπ∈G,s∈S
{∣∣∣fˆ(v) − fˆ(v−1)∣∣∣ , ∣∣gˆ(v) − gˆ(v−1)∣∣} < ε.
For a satisfactory approximation we use a collocation grid of size 15×15.
And we set the error tolerance ε = 10−6 and require the error in the Euler
equations to be less than 10−11 at each mesh point. However, in addition,
our method examines the error at values of the state variables which are not
used in the spline collocation procedure. For instance, we take a uniform
sample of 400 points from the feasible set Ξ and test the error of the Euler
equations at those points. We then declare as solution any set of parameters
for which the error of the Euler equation in the interior of Ξ is less than
10−6. On points next to the boundary the consumption level of one of the
7 Note that the resulting system has the coefficients of the spline functions as
unknowns.
8 The system of nonlinear equations has been solved by using a Newton based
algorithm (see Appendix A.1 for details).
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agent k, Ck and/or his held proportion of total money supply zk may be
close to zero with very high marginal utility. Also, as we are close to the
left/right part of the boundary (supposing stock holdings θ are on the x
axis), the holding cost increases. It is then clear that on this part of the
boundary the computed errors in the Euler equations are not reliable. Judd,
Kubler and Schmedders [14],[15] argue that on this part of the boundary we
should not expect too high a precision. Moreover, given that in equilibrium
the probability of the system reaching these areas is negligible, the larger
errors in the Euler equations should not be a ground to reject the solution.
We thus adopt the procedure of allowing a solution to have an error in the
Euler equation of at most 10−4 on the boundaries.
3.3 The parameterization.
In all simulations we set the endowments to be Ω1 = Ω2 = 4 all states s.
To stress the role of endogenous uncertainty and state of beliefs we do not
introduce additional heterogeneity among agents and therefore assume that
β1 = β2 = β, γ1 = γ2 = γ and ν1 = ν2 = ν. Their values will be defined
later case by case. We set the exogenous processes transition probabilities
at ϑ = 0.57 and χ = 0.4. The exogenous dividend state space is set to be
∆ =
{
DH ,DL
}
= {2.5, 1.5} and the money growth state space is set to be
X =
{
xH , xL
}
= {1.02, 0.98}.
REE are identified by the selection of as = bs = cs = ds = 0.25 for
s = 1, 2, 3, 4. In the benchmark case of rational expectations the intensity
parameters are required to be λs = µs = 1 for s = 1, 2, ..., 16.
In all RBE we set α1 = α2 = 0.57 as in Kurz [22]. We set the parameters
as = bs = cs = ds = 0.15 for s = 1, 2, 3, 4. The intensity parameters are set
to be λs = µs = 1.75 for s = 1, 2, ..., 16.
Note that the above choice of parameter values does not aim to calibrate
the model to simulate the behavior of any given country economy. We want
only to show how money non-neutrality arises in a RBE. Our simulated
economy represents an exercise in this sense. The belief intensity parame-
ters λ and µ have been chosen to be constant across states. This enable us
to impose the condition of “anonymity” as defined in Kurz [22]. The endow-
ment values have been set at a level which ensure strictly positive initial
wealth to the agents for all points in the grid G. This has also produced
substantial savings in computational efforts and thus making convergence
of our computations much smoother.
4 Simulation results: on the non-neutrality of money.
Our approach here is based on MonteCarlo simulations of the model under
study. A simulation starts either from a specific portfolio or from a grid
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of portfolios and then iterated forward by selecting numbers from a ran-
dom number generator (see Appendix A.3 for details) for the sequence of
realizations of
{(
Dt, xt, y
1
t , y
2
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
.
The results reported below are focused on studying the characteristics of
the joint effects of monetary policy and beliefs on inflation, real consump-
tion, portfolio holdings and ergodic behavior of the economy.
We first note that, because the economy at study is ergodic (as we show
below), the long term average inflation rate relative to the growth rate of
money supply in the economy, both under REE and RBE is equal to zero.
Note also that at each date t the economy is jointly affected by the
exogenous monetary shocks xt ∈ X =
{
xH , xL
}
, the endogenous states of
beliefs (y1t , y
2
t ) ∈ Y × Y = {(1, 1) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) , (0, 0)}, the real exogenous
dividend shocks D ∈ ∆ = {DH ,DL} and agents’ portfolio positions. It
is clear that for any transition of the economy within each one of the real
exogenous dividend regimes (i.e. when, due to the Markov assumption,Dt =
Dt+1 = DH orDt = Dt+1 = DL) prices and real variables are solely affected
by the compound effect of exogenous monetary shocks, endogenous states of
beliefs and agents’ portfolio positions. On the other hand, for any transition
of the economy between DH states and DL states, prices and real variables
are also affected by the real exogenous dividend shocks. We want then to
decompose the standard deviation of inflation rates and subtract from it the
effect of the real exogenous dividend regimes. To do so we first compute the
following two long term conditional inflation rates with fixed money supply
(i.e. xt = 1 all t):
iHL = EΓ
(
it+1 | Dt+1 = DH ,Dt = DL
)
and
iLH = EΓ
(
it+1 | Dt+1 = DL,Dt = DH
)
.
Now let >HLt+1 = 1 when Dt+1 = D
H ,Dt = DL and 0 otherwise, and
let >LHt+1 = 1 when Dt+1 = D
L,Dt = DH and 0 otherwise. Hence that
component of price level volatility, which is the solely joint effect of state of
beliefs, monetary policy and agents’ portfolio positions, will be defined by
the standard deviation of the random variable
ρt+1 = it+1 − iHL>HLt+1 − iLH>LHt+1. (55)
Note that the policy functions f and price functions g are not indepen-
dent of the agents’ portfolio allocations. Under RBE the agents’ endogenous
state of beliefs strongly impacts the portfolio positions of the agents. Price
and policy functions dependence on wealth distribution is a direct result of
RBE. It is endogenously generated by the unobserved state of beliefs.
We simulate the economy under study and report in the tables below
the standard deviation, min and max of inflation rates ρt (specified in (55));
the conditional mean, standard deviation, min and max of agent 1’s con-
sumption level under the two exogenous dividend regimes Dt = DH and
Dt = DL.
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We now explore the characteristics of money neutrality and the effects
of monetary policy in a symmetric REE 9. In such an equilibrium agents are
simply identical with β = 0.92, γ = 3.25 and ν = 3.25. Money neutrality is
obtained and price and policy functions do not depend on wealth distribu-
tion as no trading takes place. Table 1 (column 1) reports the statistics for
the REE. These results will provide a reference point for the study of the
characteristics of money non-neutrality of RBE’s. The results reported in
Table 1 have been obtained by generating 225 simulations, each for 20,000
periods and recording the last 2,000. We then compute the statistics on the
obtained sample of 450,000 observations.
Table 1 Characteristics of money non-neutrality.
REE RBE
std dev ρt 0.020 0.026
min ρt -0.020 -0.081
max ρt 0.020 0.076
std dev xt 0.020 0.020
avg C1t | Dt = DH 5.250 5.250
std dev C1t | Dt = DH 0.000 0.723
min C1t | Dt = DH 5.250 3.827
max C1t | Dt = DH 5.250 6.665
avg C1t | Dt = DL 4.750 4.750
std dev C1t | Dt = DL 0.000 0.630
min C1t | Dt = DL 4.750 3.497
max C1t | Dt = DL 4.750 5.973
Recall that we have assumed that the sequence {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} of money
supply growth rates are observed. It is clear that in a REE money is dy-
namically neutral in two senses:
(i) any exogenous fluctuations in xt lead to exactly equal percentage changes
in the price level;
(ii) all fluctuations in the price level induced by the observed fluctuations
in xt have no real effects.
Given these observations we now proceed to explore the characteristics
of money non-neutrality and the effects of monetary policy in asymmetric
RBE10. In such equilibria agents are hence heterogeneous as they can hold
different conditional probability beliefs at each date t.
9 It would have been more efficient to solve for the REE using a Negishi ap-
proach. We instead used the B-spline collocation method because the REE policy
function coefficients there obtained represented a good initial guess for computing
RBE’s.
10 In such equilibria agents have the same endowment and utility but hold dif-
ferent conditional probability beliefs in states of disagreement when y1t = y2t .
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In Table 1 (column 2) we report the statistical results for a RBE in
which agents’ utility function parameters β, γ and ν are set at the same
values specified for the REE in column 1.
In Figure 1 we report a sample of 100 observations of inflation rates ρt
(specified in (55)) and money growth rates xt out of a sample of 300,000 gen-
erated by the RBE of Table 1 (column 2) starting from the initial portfolio
distribution π10 = (0.5, 0.5).
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Time
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Fig. 1 Inflation rates and money growth rates in the RBE β = 0.92, γ = 3.25
and ν = 3.25.
In Figure 2 we report a typical time series of agent 1’s consumption level.
We report 20,000 observations out of a sample of 300,000 generated by the
RBE of Table 1 (column 2) starting from the initial portfolio distribution
π10 = (0.5, 0.5).
We also report the RBE simulation results for γ = {1.5, 3.25, 5} and
ν = {2.5, 3.25, 5}. Table 2 shows that the model exhibits a consistent and
homogeneous impact of endogenous uncertainty on money non-neutrality
for different values of agents’ risk aversion parameters γ and ν. Similar
results are also obtained varying agents’ discount factor β over the range
0.92 - 0.96 and keeping γ = 3.25 and ν = 3.25. We report them in Table 3.
From Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figures 1 and 2 one can see that, due to
the presence of endogenous uncertainty, money is dynamically non-neutral
under rational beliefs. Indeed, any exogenous fluctuations in the monetary
growth rate xt do not necessarily lead to equal fluctuations in the inflation
rate ρt. This can be checked from Figure 1 where the time series of inflation
rates and the time series of monetary growth rates do not overlap. Further-
more, a higher price level volatility is observed. Such a higher volatility is
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Fig. 2 Agent 1’s consumption level in the RBE β = 0.92, γ = 3.25 and ν = 3.25.
jointly induced by the growth rate of money and agents’ conditional proba-
bility beliefs. It is also clear from Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figure 2 that under
Rational Beliefs monetary fluctuations have an impact on the real economy
(for instance on agents’ consumption allocation over time). While New Clas-
sical macroeconomists focus on ad hoc exogenous informational frictions to
account for dynamic money non-neutrality we propose endogenous uncer-
tainty, which is propagated within the economy by the beliefs and actions of
agents, as the main driver of the real effects of monetary policy and money
non-neutrality. The difference in conclusions results from the existence in
our economy of unobserved states of belief which are part of the true state
space and cause the market structure to be dynamically incomplete. Such
component of uncertainty takes the form of additional prices induced by the
states of belief and by their variability over time.
We now turn to explore the ergodic behavior of both the REE and RBE
of Table 1. Note that the ergodic behaviour exhibited by the particular RBE
of Table 1 is also a feature of all the RBE’s of Tables 2 and 3. In Figure
3 we exhibit 450,000 REE portfolio allocations of agent 1 generated by an
initial selection of 225 portfolios from a uniform grid G′ ⊂ Ξ. For each initial
point, we generated 2,000 iterations and recorded all of them.
Under REE the economy converges to a steady point characterized by
a portfolio allocation π1 = (0.5, 0.5) and with consumption levels only de-
pending on the exogenous dividend shocks. In fact, generating 1 million
iterations for each one of the 225 initial points all the simulated portfolio
holdings time series degenerate to the constant sequence (0.5, 0.5).
In Figure 4 we exhibit 450,000 portfolios of agent 1 in the asymmetric
RBE of Table 1. The observations in Figure 4 were also generated by an
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Table 2 Characteristics of money non-neutrality.
γ = 1.50 γ = 3.25 γ = 5.00
ν = 2.50
std dev ρt
min ρt
max ρt
std dev C1t | Dt = DH
min C1t | Dt = DH
max C1t | Dt = DH
std dev C1t | Dt = DL
min C1t | Dt = DL
max C1t | Dt = DL
0.021
-0.045
0.044
0.529
3.701
6.710
0.460
3.373
6.062
0.024
-0.063
0.064
0.671
3.969
6.517
0.589
3.634
5.854
0.025
-0.093
0.103
0.172
4.636
5.876
0.152
4.217
5.316
ν = 3.25
std dev ρt
min ρt
max ρt
std dev C1t | Dt = DH
min C1t | Dt = DH
max C1t | Dt = DH
std dev C1t | Dt = DL
min C1t | Dt = DL
max C1t | Dt = DL
0.021
-0.048
0.046
0.426
3.605
6.761
0.369
3.317
6.089
0.026
-0.081
0.076
0.723
3.827
6.665
0.630
3.497
5.973
0.030
-0.112
0.116
0.482
4.235
6.254
0.424
3.859
5.619
ν = 5.00
std dev ρt
min ρt
max ρt
std dev C1t | Dt = DH
min C1t | Dt = DH
max C1t | Dt = DH
std dev C1t | Dt = DL
min C1t | Dt = DL
max C1t | Dt = DL
0.022
-0.053
0.052
0.333
3.607
6.753
0.287
3.320
6.083
0.028
-0.100
0.095
0.565
3.753
6.718
0.491
3.450
6.024
0.039
-0.152
0.124
0.731
3.959
6.568
0.634
3.643
5.873
Table 3 Characteristics of money non-neutrality.
γ = ν = 3.25 β = 0.92 β = 0.94 β = 0.96
std dev ρt
min ρt
max ρt
std dev C1t | Dt = DH
min C1t | Dt = DH
max C1t | Dt = DH
std dev C1t | Dt = DL
min C1t | Dt = DL
max C1t | Dt = DL
0.026
-0.081
0.076
0.723
3.827
6.665
0.630
3.497
5.973
0.025
-0.075
0.070
0.782
3.840
6.667
0.688
3.501
5.987
0.024
-0.063
0.063
0.965
3.841
6.665
0.855
3.503
6.010
initial selection of 225 portfolios from the uniform grid G′ ⊂ Ξ. For each
initial point, we generated 2,000 iterations and recorded all of them.
We observe that this economy is indeed ergodic. In fact, by generat-
ing 5 million iterations starting from the initial portfolio ditribution π10 =
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Fig. 3 REE: 450,000 observations on a grid of 225 initial portfolios.
Fig. 4 RBE: 450,000 observations on a grid of 225 initial portfolios.
(0.5, 0.5) and then recording the last 300,000 observations we recover the
ergodic set illustrated in Figure 5.
5 Conclusions.
In this work we have shown that dynamic non-neutrality of money is gener-
ically present in an infinite horizon RBE economy with financial assets.
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Fig. 5 The ergodic set of a RBE.
Given the expectational perspective proposed by the Theory of RBE, we
have demonstrated that one of the most important factors in the emer-
gence of money non-neutrality is played by endogenous uncertainty. This,
in contrast with the Rational Expectations results of money neutrality and
policy ineffectiveness, has led to a scenario in which monetary policy has
an impact on the real economy and price volatility. We also showed that
the heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution and intensity of
agents’ states of optimism/pessimism can amplify or reduce the real effect
of monetary policy, generate Endogenous Fluctuations and give rise to a
persistent effect on the long term price level volatility. Furthermore, un-
der Rational Beliefs, states of beliefs and monetary policy have an effect
on agents’ portfolio allocations, hence on wealth distribution, resulting in
a broader equilibrium set of trading opportunities. Under Rational Beliefs
agents have different beliefs and different predictions about the effect of
any particular monetary policy. And, due to the endogenously propagated
mistakes of agents, monetary forces do have an impact on the real variables
of the economy. We then conclude that money non-neutrality is mostly an
expectations driven phenomenon. Throughout the paper we have assumed
that money growth rates xt are observable at date t. Additional assump-
tions of asymmetry of information and/or unanticipated monetary policy
have not been needed to explain the real effect of monetary policy as it is
customary in the New Classical Theory. The impact of agents’ state of be-
liefs on equilibrium dynamics has been sufficient to generate the empirically
observed phenomenon of money non-neutrality. It is clear that the proposed
paradigm of the Theory of Rational Beliefs has very important implications
to the study of economic fluctuations and to the conduct of monetary pol-
Money non-neutrality in a RBE with financial assets. 29
icy. The results obtained in the present study, Motolese [28] and Nielsen [29]
represent a first step in addressing the implications of the theory proposed
by Kurz [18], [19] to monetary policy. However, the issues involved are so
complex that they cannot be completely and exhaustively captured by the
simple model reported in this study. Further research is needed in order
to obtain a satisfactory and consistent corpus of implications to monetary
policy from the perspective of the Theory of Rational Beliefs.
We have also addressed the issue of how to compute numerical solutions
to Rational Beliefs infinite horizon economies. In computing equilibria we
have followed the work of Judd, Kubler and Schmedders [15] who developed
a computational procedure based on the B-spline collocation methods of
approximating the equilibrium price and portfolio policy functions. The
algorithm we have used has been coded and implemented in a sequential
fashion. Parallel computing techniques have been later used to solve similar
models and that has drastically reduced computational time.
Appendix.
A.1: Solving the system of nonlinear equations.
The system of nonlinear equations (53)-(54) has been solved using the soft-
ware package TENSOLVE, a suite of FORTRAN 77 subroutines for solving
large systems of nonlinear equations using either Newton/Gauss-Newton
method or a new class of methods called tensor methods. For a complete
overview of the software package TENSOLVE see Bouaricha A. and Schn-
abel R. B. [3]. All computations have been implemented in FORTRAN on
DECStations Sun Ultra Enterprise 5000/200.
A.2: Approximating the equilibrium functions.
The equilibrium functions have been approximated by a two-dimensional
tensor product of B-splines of order 4. Given a grid of knots (xi, yj), for
each sequence of knots, order k B-splines are recursively defined by:
Bki (z) =
z − zi
zi+k − ziB
k−1
i (z) +
zi+k+1 − z
zi+k + 1− zi+1B
k−1
i+1 (z)
with
B0i (z) =

0, z < zi
1, zi ≤ z ≤ zi−1
0, z ≥ zi
.
Given a function f (x, y) and points
{((x1, y1) , f (x1, y1)) , ..., ((xn, yn) , f (xn, yn))} ,
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the knot sequences can be chosen such that there is a unique interpolating
cubic spline (i.e. a piecewise polynomial function)
fˆ (x, y) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αijBi(x)Bj(y),
which is a two-dimensional tensor product of B-splines. For an overview
about B-splines see Judd [13].
Also De Boor [6] gives a detailed introduction into the representation of
B-splines and how they can be applied to the approximation of functions.
Moreover, he provides all the FORTRAN subroutines that we used for our
computations.
A.3: MonteCarlo simulations.
The MonteCarlo simulations have been implemented by using the FOR-
TRAN routine UNI to generate quasi uniform random numbers on [0, 1).
The routine, written by Blue, Kahaner and Marsaglia, is based on a Fi-
bonacci generator. Extensive references about the routine UNI can be found
in Kahaner D., Moler C. and Nash S. [16]
References
1. Azariadis, C., Self-fulfilling Prophecies. Journal of Economic Theory 25, pp.
380-396, (1981).
2. Azariadis, C., Guesnerie, R., Sunspots and Cycles. Review of Economic Stud-
ies 53, pp. 725-737, (1986).
3. Bouaricha, A., Schnabel, R. B., TENSOLVE: A software Package for Solv-
ing Systems of Nonlinear Equations and Nonlinear Least Squares Problems
Using Tensor Methods. Argonne National Laboratories, Illinois, (1994).
4. Cass, D., Shell, K., Do Sunspots Matter? Journal of Political Economy 91,
pp. 193-227, (1983).
5. Chiappori, P. A., Guesnerie, R., Anticipations, Inde´termination et Non-
neutralite´ de la monnaie. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 19, pp. 1-25,
(1990).
6. De Boor, C., A Practical Guide to Splines. Springer Verlag, Berlin and New
York, (1978).
7. Fisher, S., Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal
Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy 85, pp. 191-205, (1977).
8. Fisher, S., Anticipations and the Nonneutrality of Money. Journal of Political
Economy 87, pp. 225-252, (1979).
9. Harris, M., Raviv, A., Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race. Review of
Financial Studies 6, pp. 473-506, (1993).
10. Harrison, M., Kreps, D., Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market
with Heterogeneous Expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92, pp.
323-336, (1978).
Money non-neutrality in a RBE with financial assets. 31
11. Heaton, J., Lucas, D. J., Evaluating the Effects of Incomplete Markets on
Risk Sharing and Asset Pricing. Journal of Political Economy 104, pp. 443-
487, (1996).
12. Hume, D., Of Money, (1752). Reprinted in: Rotwein, E. (ed.) Writing on
Economics. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, (1970).
13. Judd, K. J., Numerical Methods in Economics. MIT press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachussets, (1998).
14. Judd, K. J., Kubler, F., Schmedders, K., Computing Equilibria in Infinite
Horizon Finance Economies: the Case of One Asset. Mimeo, Hoover Institu-
tion, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, (1997).
15. Judd, K. J., Kubler, F., Schmedders, K., Incomplete Asset Markets with
Heterogeneous Tastes and Idiosyncratic Income. Mimeo, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, (1997).
16. Kahaner, D., Moler, C., Nash, S., Numerical Methods and Software.
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, (1989).
17. Kurz, M., The Kesten-Stigum Model and the Treatment of Uncertainty in
Equilibrium Theory. In: Balch, M.S., McFadden, D.L., Wu, S.Y. (eds.), Es-
says on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, pp. 389-399, North Holland,
Amsterdam, (1974).
18. Kurz, M., On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs. Economic
Theory 4, pp. 877-900, (1994).
19. Kurz, M., On Rational Belief Equilibria. Economic Theory 4, pp. 859-876,
(1994).
20. Kurz, M.(ed), Endogenous Economic Fluctuations: Studies in the Theory of
Rational Belief. Studies in Economic Theory No. 6, Springer-Verlag, Berlin
and New York, (1997).
21. Kurz, M., Endogenous Uncertainty: A Unified View of Market Volatility.
Manuscript, Department of Economics, Stanford University, (1997).
22. Kurz, M., Social States of Belief and the Determinant of the Equity Risk
Premium in a Rational Belief Equilibrium. In: Abramovich, Y. A., Avgerinos,
E. and Yannelis, N. C., (eds), Functional Analysis and Economic Theory.
Springer series in Applied mathematics and Operation Research, pp. 171-
220, Springer-Verlag, Berlin and New York, (1998).
23. Kurz, M., Motolese, M., Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility.
Working Paper 99-005, department of Economics, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, (2000).
24. Kurz, M., Schneider, M., Coordination and Correlation in Markov Rational
Belief Equilibria. Economic Theory 8, pp. 489-520, (1996).
25. Lucas, Jr., R., Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 4, pp. 103-124, (1972).
26. Lucas, Jr., R., Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy. Econometrica 46, pp.
1429-1445, (1978).
27. Lucas, Jr., R., Equilibrium in a Pure Currency Economy. Economic Inquiry
XVIII, pp. 203-220, (1980).
28. Motolese, M., Dynamic Non-Neutrality of Money under Rational Beliefs:
the Role of Endogenous Uncertainty. A Ph.D dissertation submitted to the
University of Bologna, (November 1998).
29. Nielsen, C. K., Floating Exchange Rates versus a Monetary Union under
Rational Beliefs: the Role of Endogenous Uncertainty. Mimeo, Institute of
Economics, University of Copenhagen, (1997).
32 Maurizio Motolese
30. Phelps, E., Taylor, J., Stabilizing Powers of Monetary Policy Under Rational
Expectations. Journal of Political Economy 85, pp. 163-190, (1977).
31. Sargent, T. J., Wallace, N., Rational Expectations, the Optimal Monetary
Instrument and the Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 83, pp. 241-254, (1975).
32. Telmer, C. I., Asset-Pricing Puzzles in Incomplete Markets. Journal of Fi-
nance 48, pp.1803-1832, (1993).
33. Varian, H. R., Differences of Opinion in Financial Markets. In: Stone, C. C.,
(ed.), Financial Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications. Proceeding of the
11th Annual Economic Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1989.
